© 2000 by The Society for Integrative and Comparative Biology
Reading Morgan's Canon: Reduction and Unification in the Forging of a Science of the Mind1
1 Department of History, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina 27695-8108
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Lloyd Morgan's advisory "Canon" on ascribing mental phenomena had an historically unusual and deep impact. It became a dictum defining true psychological science, praised for providing the foundation of a mature, hard science. Seen as a corrective to naive methodology and excessive speculation, it appeared to demand removal of mental qualities in the name of parsimony and rigor. Thus it is also disparaged for illegitimately limiting inquiry. Viewing Morgan's method and reasoning as the reactions of a Darwinian to the problems of psychology provides insight for a science of animal mind. The Canon should be seen as methodological advice for a science caught in the tensions between materialism and subjective mental experience, having to place human mind within phylogenetic continuity. Faced with irresolvable difficulties, behavioral science has oscillated between reduction and unifying integration, typical of debates over broad conceptual issues in evolutionary biology. The reasoning behind Morgan's Canon provides a strategy for balancing these twin pulls of scientific practice.
Conwy Lloyd Morgan's advisory principle about how best to ascribe mental phenomena—the "Canon"—had an historically unusual, and deep, impact as methodological maxim. Psychologists have usually praised it for providing the foundation of a mature, hard science, a corrective to naive anecdotal and anthropomorphic methods and excessive speculation, within a linear progression of science (Boring, 1929
; Leahey, 1991) It made animal psychology, in particular, a discipline—or at least that is how it is portrayed in its frequent appearance in textbooks, reprints of classic works, and the short histories of becoming a science that introduce symposia (Wozniak, 1993; Galef, 1996). Ethologists, although just as worried about rigor, have come to disparage it for illegitimately limiting inquiry. Later reactions against the Canon were a recognition of the intemperance of behaviorism. Ethologists became concerned about defining problems away rather than addressing them empirically, and recently have considered the idea that consciousness may be after all the simplest explanation of goal-directed behavior (Galef, 1996).
The standard histories capture one thing well. Morgan's principle did seem at the turn of the century to stand for the professionalizing of psychology. Joined with other efforts at mechanism and experiment, limitations on questions of mental qualities became a standard in the new psychology (O'Donnell, 1985). Professionalizing periods, especially when scientists feel they are forging a new discipline, usually display much discussion of proper methods. These advisories have power in directing an excitingly new research program for a time. But we mustn't let the outcome—how the Canon was taken as a hallmark of becoming a real science—blind us to the historical context in which Morgan produced such advice. There has been a persistent misinterpretation of the Canon as primarily parsimonious and opposed to mentality (Costall, 1993; Wozniak, 1993). Certainly the propaganda of behaviorism colored our idea of the Canon, and Morgan's intended argument.
Historians so far have had little effect in dislodging the myth. Richards (1987) develops a rich evolutionist and philosophical context for Morgan's psychological interests, but still sees the promulgation of the Canon as reactionary rigor against earlier methods. Costall (1993) argues that the emphasis on methods is misplaced, and that Morgan was attempting to save intentionality for a Darwinian comparative psychology, reacting against anthropocentrism but not anthropomorphism. Morgan scholars agree that the key to his thinking is the opposing tensions facing a Darwinian who wished to resolve strict selectionism, materialism, and goal-directed animal behavior, constrained by a rigorous view of scientific practice (Richards, 1987; Blitz, 1992; Costall, 1993; Radick, 2000). Morgan was concerned with creating a Darwinian science of mind. Here I extend the Darwinian context to consider the type of scientific reasoning that early Darwinians championed. Morgan's strategy in the face of irresolvable tensions—evolutionary continuity vs. the separate quality of human abstract reasoning, objective observation vs. subjective experience, blind selection vs. intentionality—still holds insight for these problems.
The initial impact of Darwinism in general was the shock of identity with animals. Bridging the gap between animal and human opened the door to non-supernatural, materialist explanations of mind, which early evolutionists were quick to embrace rhetorically. Humans-as-animals would be widely accepted by Victorians along two general lines. Socially, we were seen to be caught in the laws of the struggle for existence, under the reign of natural forces in a scientifically understood world. Biologically, the connection with animals was domesticated by the elevation of animal mind. The ardent materialism of early evolutionists, such as T. H. Huxley, did not fair so well.
A number of elements of the Victorian mentality came together in visions of the evolution of mind. A culture embracing the rise of science and the control of nature also saw a rising tide of spiritual movements. Removed from nature but also removed from traditional religious comfort in a broad crisis of Christian faith, alternative spiritual seekers invested nature with new meanings. Spiritualism, pan-animism, metempsychosis and reincarnation were at the radical end of a spectrum, but wide consensus existed for accepting evolution as a creed of progress. Material progress was joined to moral and spiritual progress, using various universal principles or laws. Cosmic formulations joined human and animal consciousness—such as Herbert Spencer's increase in complexity, Alfred Russel Wallace's universal consciousness in all matter, Henri Bergson's creative evolution, Ernst Haeckel's cosmic monism and the development of awareness, and Wilhelm Bölsche's universal principle of love. Their popular assumptions about life were far from empirically rigorous. Nature and animals were imbued with spiritual depth, and the religious and sentimental reading of animal minds was as transparent entities, easily equated to our own. This also fit the Victorian sentiment toward love of domestic animals and humane treatment, wherein animals were seen as emotional equivalents, if in need of succor for their lack of rational ability. The souls of animals was a related issue, alive in the popular literature at the end of the century. The Rev. J. G. Wood, the widely-selling natural history writer, argued in Man and Beast Here and Hereafter for animals' immortal souls. He linked them to humans by evolution and acknowledged their extensive mental powers and morality. Dogs and horses, indeed, displayed superior morality to some "savages." The Rev. Wood also promoted a benign adaptationist natural selection, fit into a scheme of divine benevolence. Although Darwin would disagree with such implications, Wood could draw on The Descent of Man with its discussions of animal intelligence, language, devotion, and conscience (Darwin, 1871).
Evolution had, simply, become a grand metaphysical principle by the 1890s. The idea most embraced was not the "corrosive" nature of "Darwin's dangerous idea" (Dennett, 1995). Evolution was appealing as a universal pattern and meaning of development, providing a connectedness and purpose to historical trajectory (Bowler, 1988; Ruse, 1996). Darwin's brilliant, radical mechanism of natural selection slipped from its brief prominence, replaced by the romance of usually inherent evolutionary development, with visions of laws of order and progress in all things. And evolution, as philosophy, slipped from the scientific into the popular and philosophical literature. In fact, evolution hardly appears in zoology textbooks of the time except as phylogenetic arrangements for morphology. Its role was metaphysical and biologists were turning to more experimental questions.
Morgan's Darwinism was of a more stringent type. Although he is usually taken to have been taming the speculative excesses of Darwinian story-tellers, especially Darwin's protégé G. J. Romanes, he was nonetheless trying to be Darwinian. His plea for rigor in thinking about consciousness was not made to deny the connection that evolution showed with animals, but to acknowledge Romanes's evolution of mentality without its credulity. Morgan was not rejecting Romanes's inferences, but finally coming to grips with the unfortunate and difficult necessity of them for a comparative psychology (Costall, 1993). Comparison was the only route to an understanding of the mind's evolution, which itself was the key to understanding the human mind. Morgan's goal was to invigorate a science of mind, but as a piece of a more sweeping project. He meant to fulfill the Darwin-Romanes program of establishing an evolutionary psychology, to promote and develop "the doctrine of Evolution" (Morgan, 1890, p. vi) by extending its principles to the question of mental processes. We need to see Morgan in the 1890s as still in the first stages of a broad Darwinian revolution. Evolution's inroads into epistemology and psychology were still radical and relatively unformed. The first step in an evolutionary psychology would be animal psychology, built on the new linkage of human and animal. Animal psychology barely existed as a discipline before 1900; O'Donnell (1985) notes the small numbers of publications and professorships in animal psychology through the first quarter of the twentieth century. Darwin's insight would make animal study essential, to provide insight into the origin and function of our minds. Evolution would also mean that there exists a phylogenetic basis for comparison and inference, both to and from animals. For Morgan, a true psychology would be comparative, and necessarily inferential. That is, because he is a Darwinian, he is committed to the inferring of mentality, not opposed to its practice.
This does not seem to square with his "basal principle" stated in his Introduction to Comparative Psychology in 1894:
In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale (Morgan, 1894, p. 53).One clue is that the principle is not actually elucidated in a critique of the standards of evidence shown by Romanes-style animal anecdotes. It appears in a chapter called "Other Minds than Ours," a carefully worked out philosophical exposition of the difficulty of inference. The book is an attempt to outline the essential principles of psychology, through the lens of animal psychology despite its methodological difficulty. The way to see his project is to start not with the 39 words of the Canon, but to go back to the development of his argument in Animal Life and Intelligence (Morgan, 1890)
. There he did, gently, critique anecdotal evidence, but also elucidated the logic of investigation into animals' mental phenomena. To tie together behavior and evolution, behavior is treated as the adaptive solutions to the circumstances of life. Rather phylogenetically, he proceeds from a survey of sensory modalities to mental powers of perception, intelligence, appetence, emotion, habit and instinct, ending with a general discussion of mental evolution. With its implied levels of evolutionary advance, this would not be unfamiliar to any reader of Darwin or Romanes.
Morgan (1890, p. v–vi), however, also felt the necessity of basing his "connected whole" of theory on "sound principles of science and of philosophy." The question was whether "mind is evolved from matter, and that when the dance of molecules reaches a certain intensity and intricacy consciousness is developed" (Morgan, 1890, p. 464); he thought not. There were several alternatives for the philosophical relationship of body and mind. The "commonplace view of two distinct entities" held that either could act on the other; the "philosophic view" disallowed such action but saw harmonious activity; the "materialist" view had matter becoming self-conscious; the "idealist" view held "that the world of phenomena has no existence save as a fiction of my own mind" (Morgan, 1890, p. 468–469). In sum, these views seemed to demand that matter be conscious or that consciousness be distinct from matter. Finding both of these untenable, Morgan wished to avoid the terms completely, adhering to the "monistic hypothesis"—"the so-called connection between the molecular changes in the brain and the concomitant states of consciousness is assumed to be identity" (Morgan, 1890, p. 465). Rather than one producing the other, the two states are the same ontologically but different epistemologically. The physiological states are observable from outside ("objective") and the psychical states observable only introspectively ("subjective aspect"). This did not deny evolution of mind, because particular kinds of "brain action" that can be associated with particular psychic states evolved from "other and simpler modes of molecular motion" (Morgan, 1890, p. 466). If consciousness were a particular mode, not all psychical states would need to be conscious. What he wished to avoid was a materialism that saw mental states as only epiphenomena, and an idealism not open to scientific investigation.
His monism followed contemporary trends in German psychology and philosophy, seen in the two-aspect views of Max Müller (1887), whom he cites, and the psychophysical parallelism of Wilhelm Wundt (1887), whom he does not. For Wundt, psychology was the study of experience and thus consciousness, which has to be understood not as a mental substance but as a totality of process. Likewise rejecting both spiritual and mental separate substance, Wundt held that mental phenomena have a physical substrate but that the two phenomena must be studied independently, in parallel. They are connected but separate events, with independent laws of causality. Psychologists only study mental phenomena that are mediated through physical influences, not experimenting on mind itself but on the functionally related physiological processes. Informed introspection could direct experiment to make the analysis of human mentality more rigorous.
Morgan realized that monistic identity is an assumption, but that the scientist had to make some assumption. As he put it, "The question is—Which assumption yields the most consistent and harmonious results?" (Morgan, 1890, p. 469). The question of how the physical becomes subjectively felt in the psychical may remain, but it is "philosophically an illegitimate question." Following a tradition from Newton through Darwin, Morgan realized that a rigorous scientific approach might have to accept some qualities of the world as given, as conditions that are inaccessible in principle. The "only course open" was then "to make certain assumptions, and see how far a consistent hypothesis may be based upon them" (Morgan, 1890, p. 470).
Morgan meant to extend beyond Wundt's psychology of the individual, through a logic of inference. In observing animal behavior, one can detect and understand purposive actions, and then infer a comparable state of mind from close analysis of what we can know—our own experience. Just as we do with other humans, introspective experience allows ascription of similar mentality to other species. To omit the psychical state would be a mistake:
the psychological accompaniments of the physiological reactions of the sense-organs are matters of inference. Still, so closely and intimately associated are the physiological and the psychological aspects, that the exclusion of all references to the latter would be impracticable, or, if practicable, unadvisable. What is practicable and advisable is to remember that, even if the two are mentioned in a breath, the physiological and the psychological belong to distinct orders of being (Morgan, 1890, p. 244).We know our own psychical states, study others' "indirectly" through the study of the accompanying evolution of neurophysiology, and infer something "analogous to human consciousness" only when the physical mode, or neural processes, are analogous (Morgan, 1890, p. 480). The similarities of biology left him feeling "justified in believing that mental or conscious processes, when they emerge, are essentially similar in kind" (Morgan, 1890, p. 337). Nonetheless, Romanes's (1884)
famous diagrammatic phylogenetic tree of mental evolution raised Morgan's skepticism, because it ought to have been restricted to the observable physical realm, or at least not sorted mental phenomena inconsistently among and across phyla. The need for rigorous skepticism emerged from two classes of error. The first is misinterpretation. We can err by inferring a facile identity of mental state because alternatives are possible. Indeed, just where the behavior looks most similar the problem is most acute, and thus there is a need to caution against "the danger of anthropomorphism." This lesson comes even from comparing humans from different cultures, because emotional states "assumed their present form in the midst of complex social surroundings" (Morgan, 1890, p. 379), and are not so directly knowable as might first be presumed from physiological identity. Looking "narrowly at every anecdote of animal intelligence and emotion" and separating observation from inference, Morgan concluded that the "great number" of illustrative "stories" easily admitted of a different interpretation, devoid of emotion or rationality in the subject.
The second type of error arose from the different neural structure of each species. Animals have much the same way of using sense-data, but their senses are "combined in different proportions" (1890, p. 333). Animals need not be limited to our sensory capabilities, but can have entirely different possibilities of sensation. Their subjective experience is thus qualitatively unimaginable. Although most evolutionists created a picture of scalar hierarchy, leading to the human, Morgan was cautious. The scale of mental phenomena need not be simply additive, nor all experience like ours. Thus comparison meant strictly searching for homology and shared neurophysiology.
This second argument was a part of distinguishing perceptual inference in animals from rational analysis, building on the differences of sensory modalities and strength of instincts. The difference of animal mind, rather than any hierarchical scalar assumption about its quality relative to human, is the source of the Canon. The Canon appeared in his next work, when he turned to outlining the principles of a comparative psychology (Morgan, 1894). The canonical sentence appears twice in the third chapter, first as the conclusion to a discourse on the philosophical justification of inference, and at the end of the chapter after a discussion of possible objections to the principle and the difference expected in animal minds. This last argument was new (Morgan, 1894, pp. 56–59). In making analogies, one must be guided by adherence to consistent, known causes and explanations. The primary explanatory guide would be evolution of grades of organisms and their structures. Here Morgan uses terms such as "grades," "complexity," "increasing," and "maximum," but he is both subtle and surprising to those who think that the Canon means that animals must be lacking on a scale leading to our "higher" level of mind. He saw three possibilities for the "gauge" of "psychical level"—1) that lower animals lack some set of higher faculties that we have, or that their faculties function to a lower degree, 2) that lower animals have the same faculties but they are "uniformly reduced" to lower function, or 3) that lower animals have a "variation" on faculties, with any faculty increased or decreased in development over ours, producing a different mind. He assumed this third course, because the principles of evolution led him to "unquestionably expect" divergent faculties solving the problems of divergent conditions. He thought such a conclusion also empirically confirmed by the differences in senses and behaviors. Animals have different minds because they are different structurally, and adaptively evolved to solve different ecological problems. Unfortunately, it is also the "most difficult" and "least anthropomorphic" option guiding inference. Nonetheless, because faculties evolve out of lower ones, one should not "assume the existence of these higher faculties until good reason shall have been shown for such existence." Thus, again, the Canon.
The only help in interpreting the mental quality of behavior—whether "animals construct a similar world"—comes from the evolutionary principle that shared structures can be associated with shared "psychical products." An essential predicament in such a unifying, associationist view was that
unfortunately, we have at present but little particular knowledge of the correlation of psychical and physiological processes. We cannot, by the dissection of the brain, draw much in the way of valid and detailed inference... (Morgan, 1890, pp. 336–337).As he suggested in the closing sentence of Animal Life and Intelligence, the winning theory would be
likely to be [that] in which the greatest number of ideas are fused into harmonious synthesis; in which all the ideas are congruous; and in which the abstract or conceptual ideas, when brought into contract with concrete or perceptual states of consciousness, are found to be in harmony and congruity therewith (Morgan, 1890, p. 503).This argument specifically came from his philosophy of science, modeled after Darwin's reasoning about evolution by natural selection.
In particular, I want to focus on Darwin's use of consilience, in the final steps of reasoning about the validity of natural selection as a true cause (vera causa). E. O. Wilson (1998) made the word more current again with his book Consilience, but unfortunately used it for his sociobiological vision of a unified knowledge, by which he really means a kind of reductionism to mechanistic explanations. However, the word's earlier, mostly nineteenth-century usage is more useful; consilience is how we find an explanation convincing through the construction of explanatory consistency, coverage of diverse facts and theories, and novelty in generating new and still consistent explanations. As Darwin's defenders saw, the productivity of the evolutionary research program was an argument for its validity in theoretical explanation. Morgan realized, unlike most of his contemporaries who disregarded the core Darwinian argument for natural selection, that Darwin provided a key methodological lesson. Darwin showed how to find a true cause for a historical phenomenon that is inaccessible in any direct way, and how to make it a convincing explanation.
Morgan was not trained in "psychology" nor even animal behavior. His professional education and first work, in the 1870s, was in geology, and his first academic appointment in Britain, in 1884, was as Professor of Geology and Zoology. We have to be careful with labels in the late nineteenth century because of broadly diverse professional expertise and porous disciplinary boundaries, and Morgan showed an early interest in the philosophy of mind (Costall et al., 1997). However, the British tradition in geology meant an immersion in the logic of Lyell and Darwin, arguing for uniform, low-level causes at play over long periods of time in the construction of higher patterns. Darwin in particular adhered to the notions of demonstrating a vera causa through arguments of analogy and consistency. Worked out first in his geology, the argument from consilience was brought to bear most productively and famously in his demonstration of the truth of evolution, and of natural selection's role. T. H. Huxley, too, had an enormous influence on Morgan, training him in zoology when Morgan returned to London for postgraduate study not long after his geology degree (Morgan, 1932; Clarke, 1970). Huxley (1888) also accepted the validity of Darwinism through the logic of consilience, arguing that the convincing power of the explanation derived from its capacity, better than any competing theory, to encompass all the facts and to continue to generate novel and consistent discovery.
Morgan was trying to maintain a general theory of consciousness that would account for the most phenomena, while unifying them. Explanation meant first detecting a vera causa, identifying a theoretically competent cause. Darwin's argument for natural selection used the rule of invoking only causes that can be known independently to exist and to be competent (Hodge, 1977, 1987). The conditions of the struggle for existence and the operation of selection could be known without respect to the speciation it was then to explain. The possibility of responsibility for actual evolution in nature was argued by analogy to the observed competence of artificial selection to produce genetic changes. The known cause of artificial selection acts like a model for natural selection, and like any model it is built on known, limited circumstances. A model is interpreted only by supplemental knowledge or theories about the conditions of the world and by a theory of its data, which tells us how to assess our expectations about what kinds of causes and effects we expect to see (Griesemer and Wade, 1988). Darwin's argument for the actual responsibility of natural selection thus drew together broad comparative data, to show that biological phenomena matched the expectations of its modeled operation. Natural selection would produce on principle what we observe, and do so better than any competing explanation, naturalistic or supernaturalistic. This was the satisfaction with the theory, expressed as a consilient argument.
Darwin's fully elaborated theory, beyond the principle of natural selection, contained other general insights. Darwin, Romanes, and Morgan all assumed modular mental faculties, treatable like morphological units available for piecemeal evolutionary change. The stunningly new insight of Darwin's, though, was the power of a simple cause to produce complex effect. In particular, he showed how blind mechanical process could produce a purposive system without design. The parallel would be that mental phenomena that have always appeared to be conscious, just as nature always looked designed, might be possible without the controlling conscious mind. To those who objected that the Canon might be "shutting our eyes to the simplest explanation of the phenomena" (Morgan, 1894, p. 54)—identical animal consciousness—Morgan responded that such simplicity no more guaranteed it to be true than creationism had been. So much for the claim that he thought the Canon to be true because it is parsimonious. The Canon required consistency with known causes and patterns of the world, to build the most satisfying as well as the most rigorously productive theory.
The thing about consilient arguments—as the 150-year history of Darwin's argument for evolution by natural selection has shown—is that they oscillate. Strong dicta for research programs produce counter reactions, to recover some of what was lost in the excitement of the new productivity, especially once its limits appear to be reached. Adherence to consilience demands that all the evidence be brought to bear, and that other possible causes might exist, yet to be found. Scientists are always looking for that additional category of data that will help forge a more encompassing sense of an explanation that fits all the pieces. The twin poles of Morgan's advice were to use both animal study and introspection. Animal psychology was to include adaptive studies as well as lab experiments on faculties, and introspection was expected to be the guide for hard psychological experimentation. Models of the competence of simple mechanisms to produce complex results impose a sharp examination of any inference about complex states. Uniting the two poles are the neurophysiological correlates, demanding a strong science of mechanisms. Pessimistic about our access to neurophysiological states, Morgan had little to say about correlations beyond gross morphology of sensory and neural structure.
But, as we know, the fashion for reductionist, mechanist, mind-denying psychology invoked his name for its parsimony and denial of intrusive, messy, inaccessible mentality. This was but a swing to the most exciting new information, as demanded by a difficult problem with no direct access. In the mid-twentieth century, better methods and better models of natural selection drove the field of animal behavior back to ethology, with a similar excitement of developing a new approach. The rhetoricians of comparative psychology and ethology often claimed to be creating a new standard of science, emphasizing either reductions to mechanism or the unifying integration of evolutionary continuity.
As a historian of evolutionary biology, I am not too surprised to see an unresolvable issue lingering on for over a century. The science cannot evade the vexing issue of how to demonstrate the unobservable. Debates over mechanisms of evolution, efficacy and levels of selection, and the rates and direction of evolution have never been resolved with a definitive experiment or data-set or encompassing theory or philosophical advice. Similar lingering, oscillating debates run through ecology and ethology—e.g., the role of competition, organization of social life, origins and maintenance of altruism, and the role of consciousness.
Controversies in these disciplines have involved questions about what is appropriate evidence, the proper structure of theory, and the philosophical meaning of explanation. They bring to the surface what often lies in the background of scientists' working lives—including ideals of reductionism and mechanism, philosophical commitments to materialism or idealism, and visions of what constitutes proper science. That is, they are methodological, and force biologists to be far more philosophical, and self-consciously so, than scientists usually prefer to be. Not that they do not seem, for the time, to enjoy bashing each other with methodological cudgels.
The problem of animal consciousness will not be solved by philosophers' definitions nor historians' models, of course, any more than Morgan's psychology resolved the problem of mind. But in a longer view of historical swings in methodological commitments, always guided by the demands of demonstrating competent and actual causes in a framework of consilient explanation, I would ask—what's missing in Morgan's work? He assumed animal mind to be unobservable directly, and yet suggested consilient bridges of indirect knowledge. What research program is poised at the moment to be most exciting and productive of such useful information? Finer details of neurobiological structure? Better studies of animals' mental activities in the wild? The applied psychology of psychopharmacology? New access to the states of neurophysiology during mental processes? Any of the categories of mapping behavior to neurobiology would aid in resolving the others. Each of these directions is suggested by Morgan's logical canon, useful only if remembered in all its subtlety of sparing yet synthetic reasoning.
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Thanks for discussions about behavior and explanation to my Shoals Marine Lab colleagues Jerry Waldvogel, Hal Weeks, Patricia Savage, and Bob Kenney; and to Bob Brandon, Greg Cooper, and the philosophy of biology group at Duke. Jon Hodge and Jim Griesemer also provided both formative ideas and insightful discussions.
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1 From the Symposium Animal Consciousness: Historical, Theoretical, and Empirical Perspectives perspectives presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Integrative and Comparative Biology, 6–10 January 1999, at Denver, Colorado.
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